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Problem area 
There is wide consensus that it 
is essential for future Air Traffic 
Management (ATM) 
developments to get a grip on 
emergent behaviour, i.e. on 
behaviour that cannot be 
directly contributed to individual 
components, but that somehow 
‘emerges’ anyway. With the 
introduction of advanced ATM 
concepts as considered in the 
SESAR program (Single European 
Sky ATM Research), new 
behaviour and hazards will 
emerge that have not yet been 
seen before. In addition to 
emergent hazards, also positive 
emergent behaviour is of 
importance; unique qualities can 
be attributed to systems that 
show emergent behaviour, such 
as robustness, resilience, and 
the ability to find a reasonable 
solution quickly without 
complete knowledge or 
understanding. 
 
By now, there is an abundance 
of literature on the topic 
‘emergence’. Some papers aim 
at understanding the 
mechanisms behind emergent 
behaviour; other papers try to 
formulate proper definitions; yet 
other papers argue whether or 
not emergence actually exists, 
or pose criticism to different 
visions. When put together, the 
literature proposes numerous 
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definitions of and visions on 
emergent behaviour, or 
characterizations and 
itemizations of the properties of 
emergent phenomena, such that 
an accepted unambiguous 
definition for the concept of 
emergence does not exist.  
 
Description of work 
The approach taken in this 
paper is to identify the main 
emergent behaviour viewpoints 
from literature, and to connect 
these to practical examples from 
ATM. The eventual objective is 
not to try to formulate one all-
encompassing definition, but to 
consider each vision as another 
useful perspective that provides 
some light and understanding 
on this phenomenon. This 
should lead to a broad better 
understanding of the term 
emergence, the potential 
mechanisms behind it, and the 
potential application to ATM. 
 
Results and conclusions 
Even though all viewpoints 
outlined in this paper have their 
merits and provide additional 
insight into emergent 
phenomena, some viewpoints 
appear to be easier connected to 
ATM examples than others.  
We identified ATM examples for 
the following viewpoints:  
 Emergence as a special case 
of ‘synergy’,  
 Emergence as tension 
between ‘reductionism’ and 
‘weak downward causation’,  
 Emergence as tension 
between ‘reductionism’ and 
‘autonomy’,  
 ‘Weak emergence by 
simulation’,  
 ‘Weak emergence as 
surprise’,  
 Emergence by ‘adaptation’.  
For other viewpoints, we were 
not able to find ATM examples, 
either due to the absence of an 
unambiguous definition, or due 
to the observation that there are 
not many examples for this 
viewpoint beyond ATM either: 
 ‘Strong downward 
causation’, 
 ‘Supervenience’,  
 ‘Strong emergence’.  
Finding examples for these 
remaining viewpoints is left for 
further work.  
 
The overview of the main 
viewpoints and characterisations 
of emergence that appear in the 
literature, and the illustration 
that many of these 
characterisations can be 
observed in air transport safety 
as well as air transport risk, 
provides an alternative 
perspective of looking at air 
transport safety related 
phenomena, with the aim to 
improve our understanding of 
their mechanisms.  
 
At a next step, the insight may 
help to identify new methods or 
approaches to identify or 
analyse emergent behaviour in 
air transport. 
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ABSTRACT 
There is an abundance of literature on the subject of emergence. One 
mainstream uses the term to describe the way complex patterns arise out of a 
multiplicity of relatively simple interactions, for example the literature on 
emergent behaviour in socio-technical systems. Another mainstream, in 
philosophy, aims at properly defining and characterising emergence. For 
development of safe future ATM, all such areas are of importance. There is sound 
reason to exploit the power of multi-agent based modelling and simulation in 
the design of advanced ATM, just as it is common practice to do so in other 
complex industries. At the same time it also is clear that the performance of 
future ATM will critically depend upon their humans and organizations, and this 
forms a good rationale for considering a wider scope than what is needed for a 
multi-agent based approach. The best way to handle this for safe future ATM is 
that we learn about similarities and differences between the existing emergent 
behaviour views, and their applicability to ATM. The aim of this paper is to make 
a start with this learning. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
There is wide consensus (e.g., [Shah et al, 2005], [SESAR, 2008], [Eurocontrol, 
2010]) that it is essential for future Air Traffic Management (ATM) developments 
to get a grip on emergent behaviour. [SESAR, 2008] explains that with the 
introduction of advanced ATM concepts as considered in the SESAR program 
(Single European Sky ATM Research) yet unknown emergent risk may appear: 
new behaviour and hazards will emerge that have not yet been seen before. In 
addition to emergent hazards, also positive emergent behaviour is of 
importance; unique qualities can be attributed to systems that show emergent 
behaviour (i.e., emergent systems), such as robustness, resilience, and the ability 
to find a reasonable solution quickly without complete knowledge or 
understanding [Beart, 2003].  
 
Good historical overviews of the origin of the term emergence are given by 
[Goldstein, 1999] and [Corning, 2002]. Aristotle [Aristotle, 350 BC] already 
referred to the notion as “the whole is something over and above its parts, and 
not just the sum of them all...”. The term “emergent” is said to be coined 135 
years ago by the English philosopher G.H. Lewes [Lewes, 1875], who defined 
emergents in the context of chemical compounds in contrast to resultants: 
“Every resultant is either a sum or a difference of the co-operant forces; 
their sum, when their directions are the same − their difference, when 
their directions are contrary. Further, every resultant is clearly traceable in 
its components, because these are homogeneous and commensurable.  
It is otherwise with emergents, when, instead of adding measurable 
motion to measurable motion, or things of one kind to other individuals 
of their kind, there is a co-operation of things of unlike kinds. The 
emergent is unlike its components insofar as these are incommensurable, 
and it cannot be reduced to their sum or their difference.” 
This view of emergence amounts to saying that the properties of a “whole” (i.e. 
systemic qualities) cannot be deduced by summing or averaging the properties of 
its components. One may see that, compared to the notion of Aristoteles, Lewes 
argues that for emergence to occur, there is co-operation between components 
of unlike kind.  
 
In the 1920s and 1930s, the study of emergence was low, but it found renewed 
interest (it ‘re-emerged’) in the last decades of the twentieth century, with the 
growth of scientific interest in the phenomenon of complexity and the 
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development of new non-linear mathematical tools, [Corning, 2002]. According 
to [Goldspink & Kay, 2009], the concept of emergence first found wide adoption 
within the philosophy of science, but it more recently has been advanced within 
three distinct streams: philosophy, particularly of science and mind; systems 
theory, in particular complex systems; and social science, where it has largely 
been referred to under the heading of the micro-macro link and/or the problem 
of structure and agency. [Goldspink & Kay, 2009] also note that there has been 
relatively little cross fertilization of thinking between these streams.  
 
By now, there is an abundance of literature on the topic. Some papers aim at 
understanding the mechanisms behind emergent behaviour; other papers try to 
formulate proper definitions; yet other papers argue whether or not emergence 
actually exists, or pose criticism to different visions. When put together, the 
literature proposes numerous definitions of and visions on emergent behaviour 
(e.g., [Chalmers, 2002a], [Hoyningen & Lohse, 2009]), or characterizations and 
itemizations of the properties of emergent phenomena (e.g., [Goldstein, 1999], 
[Goldspink & Kay, 2009], and [Peterson, 2006]), such that an accepted 
unambiguous definition for the concept of emergence does not exist. The 
approach taken in this paper is to identify the main emergent behaviour 
viewpoints from literature, and to connect these to practical examples from ATM. 
The eventual objective is not to try to formulate one all-encompassing definition, 
but to consider each vision as another useful perspective that provides some 
light and understanding on this phenomenon. This should lead to a broad better 
understanding of the term emergence, the potential mechanisms behind it, and 
the potential application to ATM. 
 
The following Sections 2 through 8 each explain a main viewpoint of emergent 
behaviour from literature. Per viewpoint, an example from ATM is provided. 
Section 9 provides concluding remarks. 
 
  
 
 
 
  
NLR-TP-2011-444 
July 2011  11
 
2 EMERGENCE AS A SPECIAL CASE OF SYNERGY 
[Corning, 2002] argues that the term emergence is ill-defined and confusing. 
Therefore, he prefers to define emergence as a special case of the better 
understood concept of synergy, which he defines as follows:  
“Synergy refers to the combined (cooperative) effects that are produced 
by two or more particles, elements, parts or organisms – effects that are 
not otherwise attainable”. 
Hence, a ‘whole’ only produces synergy if it shows an effect that is not otherwise 
attainable, and synergy is not ‘more’ than the sum of the parts, just different. 
Corning adds that synergetic effects are not vague but are, as a rule, very 
concrete and measurable. One can test for the presence of synergy by removing 
one or more important parts and observing the consequences. Different types of 
synergy are identified, such as: 
 Functional complementarity effects produced by new combinations of 
different parts. An example is table salt: the parts sodium and chloride are 
toxic, but their combination no longer is.  
 Division of labour, in which processes that are difficult to combine for one 
actor are conducted by different actors together. 
 Synergy of scale, i.e. an aggregation of interchangeable, like-kind parts that 
produce unique cooperative effects. An example is a river or a pile of sand. 
 Threshold effects of synergy of scale, such as a river becoming a flood. 
 Cost and risk sharing. 
 Information sharing and joint decision-making. 
 
Corning next defines emergence as a subclass of synergy as follows: 
“Emergence would be confined to those synergistic wholes that are 
composed of things of “unlike kind”. It would also be limited to 
“qualitative novelties”— i.e., unique synergistic effects that are generated 
by functional complementarities, or a combination of labour.” 
Emergent effects would be associated specifically with contexts in which 
constituent parts with different properties are modified, re-shaped or 
transformed by their participation in the whole. Hence, water and table salt 
would be considered emergent phenomena, but a sand pile or a river would not 
be. Note that this is in agreement with Lewes’ definition of emergence [Lewes, 
1875], see Section 1, who used the term “of unlike kind” as well. 
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ATM example  
Many different humans and technical systems are involved in ATM operations: 
multiple air traffic controllers, pilots in multiple aircraft, technical systems such 
as aircraft systems, communication, navigation, and surveillance systems. All 
these components are clearly of ‘unlike kind’, and co-operate according to 
established procedures and often unwritten ways of working, aiming at a safe 
and efficient operation. We can do the Synergy test: if we leave out an important 
part such as the pilots, we would obviously have a different operation. Also 
different types of synergy can be identified: the pilots and the air traffic 
controller have different complementary roles to play (division of labour), and 
communicate vital decision information via R/T (information sharing). Finally, 
qualitative novelties in the sense of synergetic effects generated by functional 
complementarities, or combination of labour can be recognized: the controllers 
and pilots for example have functional complementarities which together ensure 
that aircraft fly in safe and orderly flows. 
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3 EMERGENCE AS TENSION BETWEEN 
REDUCTIONISM AND DOWNWARD 
CAUSATION 
Several authors have looked further into the relationship between the 
‘components’ of an emergent on the one hand, and the ‘whole’ on the other 
hand. The resulting visions on emergence can be characterized as a tension 
between two philosophical extremes: Reductionism, and Downward Causation. 
 Reductionism (also called Upward Causation) argues that a complex system is 
nothing but the sum of its parts, and that an account of it can be reduced to 
accounts of individual constituents. Reductionism does not preclude the 
existence of what might be called emergent phenomena, but it does imply 
the ability to understand those phenomena completely in terms of the 
processes from which they are composed. This reductionist understanding is 
very different from that usually implied by the term ‘emergence’, which 
typically intends that what emerges is more than the sum of the processes 
from which it emerges [Lewes, 1875]. [Corning, 2002] notices a shift in the 
meaning of reductionism: in the 19th and 20th century, it meant an 
understanding of the ‘parts’ of the system; modern-day reductionists, by 
contrast, speak of the parts and their interactions. [Corning, 2002] considers 
the latter formulation not to be proper reductionism, but rather ‘system’s 
science in disguise’, since the interactions are the system. 
 Downward causation may be seen as the opposite of the reductionism 
perspective, but several interpretations of the term are in circulation. A 
‘strong’ definition is proposed by [Sperry, 1964], who stated that in 
downward causation the higher level laws have power to downwardly control 
the lower level laws. [Chalmers, 2002] and [Bedau, 2002] consider this view 
not very scientifically useful; [Chalmers, 2002] identified only one example of 
such strong downward causal phenomenon, which is Conscience. For this and 
other reasons, other authors have started to propose ‘weaker’ definitions. 
[Campbell, 1974] defined downward causation as: ‘all processes at the lower 
level of a hierarchy are restrained by and act in conformity to the laws of the 
higher level’. For this weaker definition, many more examples can be 
identified, see e.g. [Heylighen, 1995]. In addition, the weaker definition 
leaves more freedom to be combined with reductionism views. 
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From the weaker definitions of downward causation, it may be noted that many 
phenomena considered as emerging contain aspects of both reductionism and 
downward causation. [Heylighen, 1995] for example combines these concepts by 
noting that the whole is to some degree constrained by or determined by the 
parts, but at the same time the parts are to some degree constrained by or 
determined by the whole. The difference is that in downward causation, 
determination is ‘not complete’. This makes it possible to formulate a clear 
systemic stance, without lapsing into either the extremes of reductionism or of 
holism. [Rockwell, 2002] argues that emergent causal properties are necessary 
for downward causation, though not sufficient. [Koestler, 1969] uses the 
metaphor of Janus (i.e. the ancient Roman god with two faces in opposite 
directions) to illustrate how the two perspectives (holistic vs. reductionist) should 
be treated as perspectives, not exclusives, and should work together to address 
the issues of emergence. Further, he notes that the ability to reduce everything 
to simple fundamental laws does not imply the ability to start from those laws 
and reconstruct the universe. Such constructionist hypothesis breaks down when 
confronted with the difficulties of scale and complexity. At each level of 
complexity, entirely new properties appear. [Corning, 2002] argues that since 
there are various levels of hierarchy, emergence also occurs at various levels. At 
each level there is downward causation as well as upward causation. In addition, 
causation is iterative: synergistic effects produced by emergent systems are also 
causes. This is called the Synergistic Hypothesis. [Davies, 2006] argues that the 
mechanism of downward causation can usefully be considered in terms of 
boundaries. Novelty of the whole, he argues, “may have its origin in a system 
being ‘open’; if novel order emerges, it must do so within the constraints of 
physics”. But he concludes, “openness to the environment merely explains why 
there may be room for top-down causation; it tells us nothing about how that 
causation works.” 
 
In the literature, e.g. [Castellano, 2010], there are also several discussions 
regarding problems with downward causation. [Bedau, 2002] summarises the 
three main problems as follows: 
 The very idea of downward causation is incoherent, since if higher level 
properties are emerging from lower level properties, how can they also 
causally influence these lower level properties? 
 Even if downward causation would be coherent, it would make a difference 
only if it would violate micro causal laws. 
 Even if downward causation would be coherent and consistent with 
fundamental micro laws, then any macro-level cause that has micro-level 
effect (i.e., any downward causation), will compete for explanatory relevance 
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with the micro-level explanation; the micro-level explanation would then be 
considered as more fundamental. 
[Kim, 2006] discusses two fundamental unresolved issues for emergence. The 
first is that of giving a ‘positive’ characterization of emergence; the second is to 
give a coherent explanation of how ‘downward’ causation is able to avoid the 
problem of overdetermination. [Brown, 2010], however, criticizes Kim’s 
discussion, by explaining that Kim’s concept of emergence is based on the 
notions of emergence as known in the early 20th century. 
 
ATM example  
[Chalmers, 2002] identified “conscience” as ‘the only’ example of the ‘strong’ 
definition for downward causation, which indicates that attempts to identify 
further examples in ATM are likely to be futile.  
 
An ATM example of the ‘weaker’ definition for downward causation in 
combination with reductionism is safety regulation. In the early days of air traffic, 
the number of aircraft flying was very limited, and there was not much need for 
ATM safety regulation. As the volume of air traffic increased, established working 
processes became harmonised, standardised, and captured in regulations 
(reductionism). Next, these regulations had to be complied to, and in turn 
influenced the working processes (downward causation).  
One may look at the occurrence of major accidents as another example. The 
unfortunate or erroneous interaction of several actors and components may lead 
to an accident (reductionism), while after such accident appropriate measures are 
often taken to reduce the possibility of similar accidents occurring in the future 
(downward causation). 
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4 EMERGENCE AS TENSION BETWEEN 
REDUCTIONISM AND AUTONOMY 
A similar field of tension between two ‘extreme’ views is considered by, e.g., 
[Bedau, 2002] and [Wyss, 2004]. [Bedau, 2002] introduces two ‘hallmarks’ of how 
macro-level emergent phenomena are related to their micro-level bases: 
 Emergent phenomena are autonomous from underlying processes. 
 Emergent phenomena are dependent on underlying processes. 
He explains that any way of simultaneously meeting both these hallmarks 
(autonomy vs. reductionism) is a candidate notion of emergence. He notes that 
these two hallmarks are vague, but provide structure and a framework for 
comparing the various notions.  
[Wyss, 2004] considers these same two hallmarks, which he refers to as ‘central 
ideas’, in the context of explanation of the existence of organisms. He argues 
that different current definitions of emergence are mixtures of these two ‘central 
ideas’: 
 The distinctiveness of emergent properties: Life and mind are essentially 
distinctive from physical matter; 
 The dependence of emergent properties: Life and mind are dependent on 
physical matter. 
The first idea (autonomy) gives a new identity to an emerging property. The 
second idea (reductionism) is that ultimately, everything is made of its parts.  
 
Downward causation may be argued to follow from the first ‘hallmark’ or ‘central 
idea’ (i.e. autonomy), in the view that “nothing is real unless it has causal 
powers” ([Wyss, 2004], quoting [Alexander, 1920]). This implies causal powers 
that are irreducible and fundamental; otherwise the emergent property would 
not be autonomous. As a consequence, “the causality of emergent properties is 
inexplicable in terms of, and theoretically unpredictable from, those of their base 
properties”. 
 
ATM example 
Air transport safety may be viewed as an example that meets Bedau’s two 
hallmarks or Wyss’ two central ideas. Clearly, air transport safety is dependent on 
underlying processes as the working procedures of individual components of the 
air transport system. Also, air transport safety can be considered as autonomous, 
or at least as irreducible and fundamental: safety is a result of interactions 
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between all elements of air transport, but somehow it cannot be attributed to 
one or multiple of these components themselves. Studies have argued that the 
ability of the human (pilots, air traffic controllers) to be creative, to improvise, 
and to co-ordinate in ways that are not in written procedures, makes air 
transport safe and resilient, but apparently it is still very difficult to see where 
safety really comes from (irreducibility). 
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5 EMERGENCE AND SUPERVENIENCE 
A further concept of relevance for views of emergence, is Supervenience. There 
are numerous heated discussions on the term and on how it should be 
interpreted and defined, and there is clearly no consensus. According to 
[Freewont, 2010]: 
“Supervenience is—or has become—too complicated to be given any kind 
of adequate account here. The lack of consensus among its proponents is 
striking. Its definitional vagaries, conceptual ambiguity, and appeal to a 
very diverse body of researchers has resulted in a chaotically incongruent 
body of theory.” 
 
Some of the ‘definitions’ are, see e.g. [Chalmers, 1996], [Armstrong, 1997], [Kim, 
1998], [Johansson, 2002], [Wyss, 2004], [Cooper, 2009]: 
 For two families of properties P and Q, P supervenes on Q, if two things that 
are indiscernible with respect to Q are indiscernible with respect to P.  
 An instance of P supervenes on an instance of Q, if there can be no change in 
P without corresponding change in Q (though there may be Q-change 
without P-change).  
 P-properties supervene on Q-properties if and only if anything that has a P-
property has some Q-property such that anything that has that Q-property 
also has that P-property. 
 Entity P supervenes upon entity Q if and only if it is impossible that Q should 
exist and P not exist, where Q is possible. 
 P-properties supervene on Q-properties if no two possible situations are 
identical with respect to their Q-properties while differing in their P-
properties.  
 
Different forms of supervenience are defined in e.g. [Moyer, 2000], [Freewont, 
2010], [Kim, 1984, 1993], [McLaughlin & Bennett, 2010], including ‘weak 
individual supervenience’, ‘regional supervenience’, ‘similarity-based 
supervenience’, ‘global supervenience’, ‘multiple domain supervenience’. The 
precise relationships between these different forms are still food for debate. 
 
Discussions relating supervenience with emergence are primarily discussions 
related to emergent properties being supervenient on lower-level properties, see 
e.g. [Horgan, 1993]. There is also a relation between supervenience and 
reductionism, although the precise relation is yet unclear: According to 
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[McLaughlin & Bennett, 2010], “everyone agrees that reduction requires 
supervenience”. However whether supervenience is sufficient for reduction is an 
open question.  
 
ATM example: 
Given the diversity in definitions on supervenience, we decided to leave providing 
a clear and illustrative ATM example to future work. 
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6 STRONG AND WEAK EMERGENCE 
An important step in dealing with the tension between reductionism and 
downward causation discussed in Section 3, is the definition of different forms of 
emergence. After initially distinguishing strong and weak emergence [Bedau, 
1997], Bedau distinguishes three forms in [Bedau, 2002]: 
 Nominal emergence, which is a notion of a “macro property” that cannot be a 
“micro property”.  
 Strong emergence, which is nominal emergence in which the emergent 
properties are supervenient properties with irreducible downward causal 
powers.  
 Weak emergence, which is nominal emergence that not strong. The system’s 
global behaviour derives from the operation of micro-level processes, but the 
micro-level interactions are interwoven in such a complicated network that 
the global behaviour has no simple explanation.  
Apparently, nominal emergence can be sub-divided into the other two forms. 
 
Bedau argues that ‘strong’ emergence has had a prominent place in the 
philosophical discussions but that its scientific credentials are very poor, whereas 
‘weak emergence’ is consistent with materialism and scientifically useful:  
“Although strong emergence is logically possible, it is uncomfortably like 
magic. How does an irreducible but supervenient downward causal power 
arise, since by definition it cannot be due to the aggregation of the 
micro-level potentialities? Such causal powers would be quite unlike 
anything within our scientific ken. This not only indicates how they will 
discomfort reasonable forms of materialism. Their mysteriousness will 
only heighten the traditional worry that emergence entails illegitimately 
getting something from nothing.” [Bedau, 1997] 
 
Since in Weakly emergent phenomena there is no downward causation, these 
phenomena can be derived from full knowledge of the micro-level properties, 
but only in a certain way. Bedau proceeds to defend one version of weak 
emergence (noting that there are other versions as well), which is as follows:  
“A nominally emergent property of a locally reducible system is called 
weakly emergent if it is derivable from all of the micro facts of this 
system, but only by simulation.” 
Here, in a simulation, each derivation iterates step by step through the 
aggregation of local interactions among the micro-elements. Bedau also notes 
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that there are various degrees of weak emergence, e.g. properties that are 
derivable without simulation in principle, but in practice must be simulated; 
properties that are underivable except by finite feasible simulation; properties 
that are underivable except by simulation, but the requisite simulation is 
unfeasible or infinite. He also notes a distinction between thinking that some 
phenomenon is weakly emergent compared to some phenomenon being weakly 
emergent: one may believe that a phenomenon can only be obtained by 
simulation, but fail to see that there is also a yet undetected short-cut 
explanation for it. Weak emergence is also referred to as Computational 
Irreducibility, which is characteristic for complex systems and it explains why 
computer simulations are a necessary tool in their study.  
 
Several further authors describe different orders of emergence in attempts to 
classify different types of behaviour perceived as emergent (e.g., [Gilbert, 2002], 
[Rasmussen et al, 1996], [Ellis, 2006], [Goldspink & Kay, 2008, 2009], and [Baas, 
1994]). 
 
ATM example 
An example in air transport operations of Bedau’s view of weak emergence as 
something derivable from individual components but only by simulation is 
described in [Stroeve et al., 2011]. A concept of operations is considered in 
which frequent active runway crossings take place on a departure runway in good 
visibility conditions. To limit potential risks related to such operation, the 
concept included a runway incursion alerting system to warn the air traffic 
controller in situations in which a departing and a crossing aircraft 
simultaneously make use or start making use of the runway.  
According to early safety assessments using traditional approaches as fault trees 
and event trees, the alerting system would provide a significant risk reducing 
effect. However, according to Monte Carlo simulations of a dynamic risk model of 
the actors, systems and interactions, the risk decreasing contribution of the 
alerting system and the air traffic controller in the same concept appeared small. 
The key new insight obtained from the simulations was that in most situations in 
which the alerting system enables the air traffic controller to warn the pilot, the 
pilots of one of the involved aircraft has already identified and started to solve 
the conflict theirselves. If in time-critical situations the pilots did not detect the 
conflict, then it would often neither be resolved via the alerting system, e.g., 
because of a late alert, delay in the communication line between controller and 
pilots, or a late or inappropriate reaction of the controller or pilot. 
The described effect was discovered only after developing and simulating a 
dynamic risk model that covered the totality of interactions of components 
  
 
 
 
  
NLR-TP-2011-444 
July 2011  23
 
including their variability in performance over time. The complexity of air 
transport operations involves a combinatorial explosion of the many events that 
may occur in a dynamic way and the many involved uncertainties, such that 
certain aspects of safety risk can only be studied through simulation. The human 
mind is simply not able to grasp the many combinations of events occurring later 
or earlier than average, or resolutions of situations that are implemented in 
another way, not even when supported by graphical tools such as tree-based 
schemes or analytical equations. The Monte Carlo simulations made it possible 
to identify how the operation evolves through time in a dynamic way, addressing 
to a larger extent the combinatorial explosion and allowing specific behaviour to 
emerge. 
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7 EMERGENCE BY SURPRISE 
Chalmers [Chalmers, 2002a] includes a notion of “unexpectedness” or “surprise” 
to the definition of emergence when providing alternative definitions for strong 
and weak emergence: 
 A high-level phenomenon is strongly emergent with respect to a low-level 
domain when truths concerning the phenomenon are not deducible even in 
principle from truths in the low-level domain. 
 A high-level phenomenon is weakly emergent with respect to a low-level 
domain when truths concerning the phenomenon are unexpected given the 
principles governing the low-level domain. 
Note that this definition of strong emergence relates to ‘autonomy’, see Section 4. 
 
Other authors also refer to the notion of surprise, such as [Sanz, 2004] who 
defines emergence as:  
“just systemic behaviour — nothing more, nothing less— that is difficult 
to predict in advance”. 
Bedau [Bedau, 2002], explains that he left the notion of surprise absent on 
purpose, due to it being rather subjective. Bedau instead claims that, with his 
definition of weak emergence in terms of simulation (see Section 6), he is 
presenting objectivist approaches to emergence, though notes that his 
classification is not exhaustive. 
 
[Johnson, 2006] seems to agree with Bedau on this by noting that problems may 
arise when engineers combine different meanings, such as a ‘surprise factor’ 
implicit in predictive approaches, while talking about the design of emergent 
properties. The predictive approach to emergence raises questions about the 
perspective of the person making the predictions; no-one has perfect 
knowledge. Johnson also argues that several accidents are attributed to 
emergent behaviour, even though often engineers have issued warnings about 
possible accidents that have been ignored until after an adverse incident has 
occurred (making the accidents less of a surprise to these engineers). Therefore, 
another, perhaps less subjective approach to the predictive issue is to define 
emergent phenomena as: 
“those that possess interesting properties that were not included in the 
goals of the designer.” 
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[Johnson, 2006] notes that the unpredictiveness notion of emergence can be 
contrasted with the notions of weak and strong emergence. He notes that 
“contradiction arises because engineers freely move from predictive definitions in 
which emergence is equated to a surprise and definitions of strong emergence 
where higher-level patterns can be used as design templates.” Johnson argues 
that greater care must be taken when using terms such as ‘emergence’.  
 
[Stephan, 2002] also considers this notion of surprise, formulated as 
‘unpredictability’, and takes an extended approach to the notions of weak and 
strong emergence by adding the concept of diachronics, which deals with 
phenomena happening over a period of time. To this end, Stephan considers 
three notions: 
 Novelty: In the course of evolution exemplications of ‘genuine novelties’ 
occur again and again. Already existing entities form new constellations that 
produce new structures which may constitute new entities with new 
properties and behaviours. 
 Irreducibility: Stephan notes that the failure to keep two different kinds of 
irreducibility apart has muddled recent debate about emergence. These two 
different kinds of irreducibility, downward causation and unanalyzability of 
systemic properties, have quite different consequences:  
o If, on the one hand, a system’s property is irreducible because of the 
irreducibility of the system’s parts behaviour on which the property 
supervenes, we seem to have a case of downward causation. This kind of 
downward causation does not violate the principle of the causal closure of 
the physical domain. 
o If, on the other hand, a systemic property is irreducible because it is not 
exhaustively analyzable in terms of its causal role, downward causation is 
not implied. Rather, it is dubitable how unanalyzable properties might 
play any causal role at all.  
 Unpredictability: Likewise, an emergent property can be unpredictable if it is 
instantiated by a given kind of structure in a given kind of system, and that 
structure is unpredictable, or if even when the structure is predictable, the 
emergence of the property is in itself unpredictable, because that property is 
irreducible. 
 
These notions are next used in a scheme of different types of emergence: 
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Weak emergence Weak diachronic emergence
Diachronic structure emergence
Synchronic emergence Strong diachronic emergence
+ novelty
+ irreducibility
+ novelty
+ irreducibility
+ unpredictability
Figure 1: Different types of emergence are related by adding notions of novelty, 
unpredictability and irreducibility; figure based on [Stephan, 2002]. 
 
The scheme is explained as follows: 
 Weak diachronic emergence results from weak emergence by adding a 
temporal dimension in the form of the thesis of novelty. Both versions are 
compatible with reductive physicalism. 
 Synchronic emergence results from weak emergence by adding the thesis of 
irreducibility, i.e. being not reductively explainable. This version of 
emergence is not compatible with reductive physicalism. Synchronic 
emergence is of particular interest for the discussion of downward causation. 
 Strong diachronic emergence only differs from synchronic emergence 
because of the temporal dimension in the thesis of novelty. 
 In contrast, structure emergence is entirely independent of synchronic 
emergence. It results from weak diachronic emergence by adding the thesis 
of structure-unpredictability. Although structure emergence emphasizes the 
boundaries of prediction within physicalistic approaches, it is compatible with 
reductive physicalism, and so it is weaker than synchronic emergence.  
 
ATM example 
The surprise factor can also be identified for the example considered in Section 
6. Initially, the expectation of the designers of the concept of operation was that 
the new runway incursion alerting system would make the controller significantly 
reduce the risk of the operation [Scholte et al., 2009]. A cause for this 
expectation is that air traffic controllers usually see aircraft brake after their 
halting instructions. In such case, the air traffic controller may perceive to have 
played a key role in resolving the conflict well, while not being aware that the 
conflict is actually solved by the pilots who had already identified and started to 
solve the conflict independently. It came thus as a surprise that the risk reducing 
effect of the alerting system was in practice much smaller. 
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8 EMERGENCE BY ADAPTATION 
[Zarboutis & Wright, 2006] explain that in complexity science, each component 
interacts with its neighbouring ones by triggering the other at its border. 
Subsequently, this other component changes its internal organisation 
accordingly, through structural changes in order to assure the satisfaction of 
individual criteria, using local information and usually being unaware of the 
behaviour of the whole system. This process is known as adaptation. 
Subsequently, [Zarboutis & Wright, 2006] explain the notion of emergence as 
follows (see also the figure below):  
“The behaviour of the system is considered to be the product of local 
level interactions on various layers. On each of them, the components 
may locally interact; they can have their own structure and autonomous 
behaviour. However, only at a higher level, the properties of these 
interactions are evident. This operational mechanism of a complex 
system, where the product of local level interactions at a given level is 
evident at the higher one is called emergence and these higher level 
properties are called emergent properties of that level. This process of 
(bottom-up) emergence at the higher level undergoes simultaneously a 
form of (top-down) hierarchical control that wants to assure that the 
emergent properties are meaningful. The resilience of a complex system 
is dependent on a form of optimal adaptation, which goes through the 
balance between emergence and hierarchical control. The design of an 
effective hierarchical control system (e.g. a barrier system), so as to shape 
the emergent phenomena of the system, is the ultimate challenge for the 
engineering of complex systems.” 
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Lower level
component
Lower level
component
Higher level emergent properties
Components interact and adapt to each other
Properties 
emerge
from the 
lower level
interactions
In optimal adaptation, the 
emergent properties 
and the hierarchical control
 are being balanced
Properties 
are 
controlled 
to assure 
them to be 
meaningful
Resilience
 
Figure 2: In Complexity Science, properties emerge from interactions between low 
level components and are being controlled in a balanced way to provide 
resilience. Figure based on theory proposed in [Zarboutis & Wright, 2006]. 
 
[Zarboutis & Wright, 2006] further explain that while strong predictions (i.e. who, 
when, where, etc.) of the behaviour of complex systems are impossible to 
achieve, it is possible to identify some recurrent patterns that, once emerged, 
divert the behaviour of a complex system towards a systemic collective event: 
 Self-Reference. Is the pattern where an organisation produces by itself, the 
structure that creates itself, in a recurrent way in time, as a system evolves. 
 Infinite Loops. Is a repetition of a set of processes until a condition is met. 
Once such condition is fulfilled then the loop exits to some given point. 
However, failing to meet this end condition, this iteration may continue 
endlessly and in most cases it can only be exited upon the imposition of 
some external force, intentional or unintentional. 
 Stigmergy. Is an indirect mechanism of interaction where two parts each 
modify the environment, on which the other part adapts. 
These primitive patterns need not be mutually exclusive; they usually stem out of 
lower level interactions and collectively give rise to some higher level patterns, 
which shape the system’s emergence and which is referred to as co-adaptation.  
 
Co-adaptation is responsible for some ‘peculiar’ collective phenomena, not 
immediately apprehensible through analytical reasoning. In general, co-
adaptation is the process where two agents adapt to the same problem, each 
pursuing its own private goals. Within a complex organisation, co-adaptation is 
catalysed by stigmergy. Co-adaptation can have positive or negative effects on 
system performance. Under normal circumstances, the typical outcome of a co-
adaptive act could lead to positive redundancy. But when the interacting agents 
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pursue different or conflicting objectives, the system may collectively fail to 
adapt to external perturbations in a desired way and a systemic failure may take 
place.  
 
The elimination of such patterns requires the removal of the sources that lead to 
their emergence. Thus, if we can assure for example that the interacting agents 
would always form common objectives, or that the necessary external forces 
would be present for an agent to exit the infinite loop that s/he is trapped into, 
then we will have achieved a more resilient organisation that would have the 
potential to create and maintain safety. Modelling the system through an explicit 
account of emergence, self-organisation and hierarchical control, the role of 
such patterns can become evident, while the relevant causes that diminish the 
resilience of the system can be identified. 
 
ATM example 
The air transport system of today is the result of decades of evolutionary 
development. Each day, it adapts to changing circumstances, such as changing 
passenger volumes, new rules, public safety perception, economic crises, 
environmental disruptions (e.g. volcano ash). There is a certain level of central 
control (e.g. ICAO), but most details are determined in a non-centralised way and 
adapted to the local circumstances (e.g. geographical location, weather 
circumstances, local passenger throughput), even though air transport is very 
international. Human operators are very well capable to adapt to the current 
circumstances. Higher level properties such as efficiency, capacity and safety 
emerge from the interactions and are balanced with each other and controlled, 
e.g. by flow management. Because of all these mechanisms, the air transport 
system appears to be very robust and resilient against disruptions and changes. 
  
 
 
 
32 NLR-TP-2011-444 July 2011  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This page is intentionally left blank. 
  
 
 
 
  
NLR-TP-2011-444 
July 2011  33
 
9 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Air Transport Safety is the result of co-operation of multiple humans, 
organisations and technical systems, which are coupled in an indirect way, who 
work according to established procedures and many unwritten rules, and who 
interact with each other in a dynamic way in order to cope with the ever changing 
circumstances. As such, safety has many characteristics of an emergent 
phenomenon. This has a few negative aspects, such as a certain level of 
unpredictiveness, but it also has important benefits. The latter is shown by e.g. 
[Beart, 2003], who emphasises the positive aspects of emergence. He claims that 
there are things that emergent systems can do that other systems cannot: 
 They are robust and resilient. There is no single-point of failure, so if a single 
unit fails, becomes lost or is stolen, the system still works.  
 They are well-suited to the messy real world. Human-engineered systems 
may be ‘optimal’ but often require a lot of effort to design and are fragile in 
the face of changing conditions. Importantly, they don’t need to have 
complete knowledge/understanding to achieve a goal (e.g. social systems in 
warehousing).  
 They find a reasonable solution quickly and then optimise. In the real world, 
time matters - decisions need to be taken while they are still relevant. 
Traditional computer algorithms tend to not produce a useful result until 
they are complete (which may be too late, e.g. if you’re trying to avoid an 
oncoming obstacle). 
[Beart, 2003] further claims that these positive aspects are due to the individuals 
interacting with each other directly or indirectly (via their environment). 
Interacting via an effect on, and response to, their common environment is called 
stigmergy (see also Section 8). 
 
In the philosophy, social sciences and systems theory literature, a lot has been 
written on emergence, but still there does not seem to be a well-established, 
unambiguous definition of the term. There are many discussions on what 
emergence is, where it may come from, and how the mechanisms may be 
understood. Different authors do not seem to agree, but many different 
viewpoints contribute to the further analysis and understanding of the 
phenomenon.  
 
This paper has given an overview of the main viewpoints and characterisations of 
emergence that appear in the literature. Next, it has shown that many of these 
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characterisations can be observed in air transport safety as well as air transport 
risk. This way, an alternative perspective was provided of looking at air transport 
safety related phenomena, with the aim to improve our understanding of their 
mechanisms. At a next step, the insight may help to identify new methods or 
approaches to identify or analyse emergent behaviour in air transport. 
 
Further work 
Even though all viewpoints outlined in this paper have their merits and provide 
additional insight into emergent phenomena, some viewpoints appear to be 
easier connected to ATM examples than others.  
We identified ATM examples for the following viewpoints:  
 Emergence as a special case of synergy (see Section 2),  
 Emergence as tension between reductionism and weak downward causation 
(part of Section 3),  
 Emergence as tension between reductionism and autonomy (see Section 4),  
 Weak emergence by simulation (part of Section 6),  
 Weak emergence as surprise (see Section 7),  
 Emergence by adaptation (see Section 8).  
Finding examples for the remaining viewpoints, i.e. ‘Strong downward causation’ 
(part of Section 3), ‘Supervenience’ (see Section 5), and ‘Strong emergence’ (part 
of Section 6) is left for further work. Note that for ‘Strong downward causation’ 
and ‘Strong emergence’, the non-ATM literature reports only one example, i.e. 
conscience, hence finding ATM examples for these viewpoints could be a 
challenge. For ‘Supervenience’, the challenge lies in first finding an unambiguous 
definition of the term itself.  
 
Further insight can be gained in showing how the different viewpoints relate to 
each other, and how they can be used to explain the mechanisms behind 
emergence in air transport. 
 
A further direction of possible future work is to improve the way that safety 
analysis addresses emergent behaviour in concepts of future ATM operations. 
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